

# INTER-OFFICE CORRESPONDENCE

FROM: RSM

DATE: January 25, 1961

TO:

UGH	FEB 20 1961	<i>[Signature]</i>

COMMENTS:

FEB 20 1961

SUBJECT: Technical Assistance to Underdeveloped Countries

1. I have found our recent discussion on technical assistance to underdeveloped countries interesting but somewhat unsatisfactory because of what seems to me to have been the failure to differentiate clearly between what we might have to say to official agencies in advising them about their programs and what we have to say to ourselves about what is appropriate for a private organization like The Rockefeller Foundation. To me the over-all national task is nothing less than that of transferring as rapidly and efficiently as we can as much of the accumulated knowledge of the Western world about how to run a society as we can possibly manage. The Foundation's task must clearly be much more limited than this because of our much more limited resources.
2. CBF may well be right when he stresses that the primary purpose of our national program is political. It may, however, be worth some effort to become a little clearer about what we mean by this word. In thinking about this matter I tend to take off from Lincoln's famous statement that "This government cannot endure permanently half slave and half free." If this was true about the U. S. in 1860, it seems to be equally true in 1960 that the world cannot long endure when the more advanced countries enjoy a standard of living some 40 or 50 times higher than the lowest. It is, therefore, to the political interest of the advanced countries to do something to redress the imbalance which now exists. In addition to this purely pragmatic statement of the case, it does not seem to be unduly sentimental or softheaded to attempt to dignify and add emotional appeal to the effort by putting the matter in altruistic, philosophical, moral, or even religious terms. After all, it is a very valuable characteristic of human beings in general to feel sympathy for the underprivileged and to try to do something to better their condition. Some people find comfort and inspiration

in sharing their lot with others on the deeply-felt belief that all men are brothers because they are sons of God. Others, like myself for example, derive a sense of unity with the rest of mankind from the biological fact that we all share a common gene pool and are engaged in what seems to me to be a great experiment in exploring the potentialities of creative evolution. I would simply hate to see the experiment stopped prematurely by a failure to develop the social mechanism necessary to keep our gene pool intact.

3. The progress of man to date and the thing that sets him off from all other animals has been his capacity to accumulate and share knowledge. Through the last 500 years this process has been going on with unexampled rapidity but has been more or less limited geographically to Western Europe and North America. This has gotten the human race somewhat out of gear with itself and I find it very challenging to think of the next century in terms of sharing the advantages of civilization as widely as possible.
4. As Americans and Western Europeans, we naturally tend to feel that our particular brand of civilization is the best one, but I dislike very much to think of our present situation purely in terms of a conflict between Western democratic civilization and Eastern communist or totalitarian patterns. Clearly there is a conflict and it is important, but it seems a mistake to me to regard the two systems as completely and diametrically opposed. To me the principal defect in communism is that it takes too limited a view of the human condition and proposes far too limited solutions. Biologically speaking, it tries to direct the evolutionary process in a single restricted direction rather than allowing for the free play among new "cultural mutations" that are the essence of the creative process. I am convinced, therefore, that the Western world has a real obligation to see to it that the rest of the world is kept as free as possible to work out its own destiny. The underdeveloped countries cannot participate effectively unless they receive a large transfusion from our accumulated stocks of ideas and techniques.
5. It is only too obvious, of course, that as a matter of actual fact at the present time we are in conflict with the communist countries. CBF, therefore, is on sound ground when he emphasizes the importance of making and keeping as many friends as we can and designing some of our technical assistance with this in mind. As a matter of fact we would probably not be very successful in developing the underdeveloped countries unless we maintain some sort of friendly relationship even if it were not necessary to do so in order to ensure an adequate number of allies in the conflict with the East. Nevertheless, it seems a considerable mistake to me to regard these friendly relations as ends in themselves. They should be thought of merely as more or less indispensable means to achieving the long-term ends we have in mind.

6. Having dealt briefly with these background matters, we can now turn our attention to how to set about doing the job. Almost everyone who has thought about the problem seems to agree that the problem of underdevelopedness must be attacked as a whole. Everything has to be done more or less at once. One cannot reasonably begin, for example, merely by emphasizing the importance of elementary education or improved nutrition or better health services, more efficient government agencies, and so on. Each one depends upon the other. We cannot go very far in building up the elementary schools without finding the money to run them. This means that something must be done to improve the economic system but we cannot introduce industry until there is capital to supply the necessary plants and people with at least a minimum of schooling to operate them. Health services may be improved slightly by mounting special campaigns for the control of specific diseases, staffed largely by outside personnel. But the control of one disease merely leads to an increase in another and again we soon reach a point where local resources, both of personnel and money, must be found for a more comprehensive health service. Clearly CBF is right when he stresses the fact that any existing underdeveloped country has a variety of strengths and weaknesses. A program for any given country must take these different strengths and weaknesses into account, but it cannot content itself only with building on strength since this course is sure to produce further imbalances. Direct attack must ultimately, and to my mind rather early, be made on the weaknesses.
7. Since as we have seen above the problem of developing underdeveloped areas is largely one of sharing the accumulated ideas and techniques of more advanced areas, it is clear that one of the first steps that must be made is to equip the population with the tools by which new knowledge is shared. In other words, we must have a good primary and secondary school system. Few underdeveloped countries have economies sufficiently advanced to provide adequate financing for universal elementary education. Even more important is the lack of trained teachers. Although a successful educational system ultimately contributes more than almost anything else to the prosperity of a country, it cannot be regarded as self liquidating in the usual economic sense. It would seem, therefore, that money provided from outside for this purpose should be in the form of outright grants and that these grants should be repeated on a declining basis until the economic system locally can take over the job. This might be as long as 20 or 30 years in some areas. In countries of this general type it will probably be necessary also to import teachers for at least a decade, and I for one can see some hope of a properly organized youth corps for use in this way.
8. Very similar considerations apply to the organization of health services in really primitive countries. Almost all the colonial powers

found it necessary to organize and staff health services for their colonies with virtually all the professional personnel coming from outside. The remnants of these services exist in many places, although expatriate staff is now drawn from wider areas than it used to be. No underdeveloped country can yet afford anything like adequate health services staffed from outside and it seems doubtful if they ever will be. Some, like the Belgian Congo, are completely relying on outside financing for even their very primitive skeletal health service. The long-term solution, of course, is to develop local medical schools and institutions for training ancillary medical personnel. Much more study, incidentally, should be given to the efficient use of medical assistants, public health nurses, midwives, and so on, under the direction of trained physicians and public health experts who bid fair to be in short supply for several decades. There are at least two reasons for believing that it might be worthwhile for a country like the U. S. to contribute rather heavily to the basic expenses of medicine and public health in certain types of underdeveloped countries on a long-term basis. The first of these is that in many areas poor health does seem to be a serious impediment to economic advance. The people are really too sick to put in an adequate day's work. The second is that next to adequate food, good health is one of the most immediately prized possessions of every man. Since the entire populations of most underdeveloped countries have been promised almost immediate improvement in their condition, and it is most unlikely that they will experience very much improvement in their general economic state for some years to come, improvements in health may stand as important indications that things are really getting better at the grass roots. I think that everyone who has been to Russia recognizes the importance which the population attaches to the rapid improvement in health services which has occurred during the last 20 years, even though such matters as food, housing, clothing, and the more luxurious accompaniments of Western civilization continue in very short supply. The same is perhaps even more true of China.

9. The improvement of agriculture is in all underdeveloped countries basic to the improvement of health and welfare. In many it also occupies an important place in the export economy and forms the basis for capital accumulation on which the further development of the society as a whole depends. Since you and others in the Foundation know a lot more about this than I do, I don't propose to say much about it. This may, however, be the place to record my uneasiness over the growing tendency on the part of our government to deal with food shortages throughout the world on what seems to me a very dangerous temporizing basis. It seems to me unsound to provide gifts of grain and other food surpluses to other countries on anything except a very short-term emergency basis. Even here the long-run effects are likely to be bad, since it merely encourages the growth of populations to a size which cannot be sustained by



local agriculture. Unfortunately, the internal pressure in the U. S. to dispose of our surpluses works together with a sentimental humanitarian impulse to give more weight to this mechanism of helping underdeveloped countries than it probably deserves. The situation might not be so bad if the counterpart funds derived from sale of agricultural surpluses were immediately devoted to improving the agricultural production of the receiving country, but too often, as is well known, these funds merely stay hoarded in banks where they serve to provide credit for developing other aspects of the economy if they do anything at all.

10. The fourth great section of the development effort is concerned with building a viable economic system which includes such fundamental matters as roads, railroads, irrigation and power dams, as well as steel mills and secondary industry. This is a subject which has been much discussed, both in public and private, by economists of all descriptions, and there seems no need to summarize the literature here, even if I knew it. The theory of the situation seems to be pretty well understood, but as we all know the actual practical efforts of our government agencies in the economic development of these countries leave a good deal to be desired. One has the impression that the World Bank and the Export-Import Loan Fund are doing the best job in this area and that their activities should be expanded as fast as practicable. Past ICA efforts strike one as having been too much motivated by short term and political objectives and the selection of projects which will have an obvious immediate "impact."
11. One can't help wishing that some way could be found to develop private industry more effectively in underdeveloped countries. One realizes, of course, that the experience of many underdeveloped countries with private industry from abroad has not always been happy. Furthermore, it seems inevitable that most newly developing countries will tend to be socialistic in structure since it is only the government that has any command of appreciable capital funds. Nevertheless, private industry is an important part of the economic picture in all Western countries and it would seem a pity if this characteristic of our pluralistic democratic way of life were not incorporated fairly soon in the new countries.
12. There is a growing feeling that most, if not all, economic aid should be in the form of long-term, low-interest loans, rather than as gifts. Most of the programs undertaken should be self liquidating within a reasonable time or they shouldn't be started. It seems probable that recognition of the need for ultimate repayment will serve as a stimulus for sound planning jointly arrived at by the lender and borrower. Furthermore, experience has shown that sound, business-like arrangements help preserve the morale of the receiving country and prevent the development of resentment and hard feeling, which frequently result from

outright gifts. It is noteworthy that Russia made a careful study of U. S. experience before deciding to provide all its economic assistance in the form of loans or trade agreements.

13. As a fifth point, it is very generally agreed that there is a great lack in all underdeveloped areas of administrative and managerial skills. This is seen not only in the economic sphere, but is characteristic also of educational institutions and government services. All of us in the Foundation realize that we can only go so far in building up our separate technical interests without running into almost insurmountable barriers caused by the lack of good management of the institutions with which we deal. It is very difficult to attack this problem as such and I believe that many of us are skeptical about such ad hoc measures as schools of administration and management, and the like. On the other hand, if each one of us engaged on a piece of the problem of technical assistance would bear these administrative problems in mind more continuously, it is possible that progress could be made. For example, if every big construction project was looked upon, in part at least, as an educational venture, more attention might be given to selecting technicians from the outside world who were trained and motivated toward providing their local opposite numbers with better rounded experience in the problem of management, as well as with scientific and engineering techniques. Similarly, those of us who devote most of our time to educational institutions and research institutes might try to see to it that more of our fellows and travel grantees spent time studying problems of management and administration in American institutions. I am thinking here, in part, of the apparent success which resulted from assigning Ernani Braga for a year to work closely with the Dean of Washington University. Conversely, the assignment of Lucien Gregg to the All India Institute is, I think, having an effect in maturing the administrative procedures of that institution. The proper conduct of such a post, however, is not an easy one and I can think of other examples in Foundation history in which the Foundation representative took too much of the managerial load off the shoulders of the people with whom he was working. One of them even went so far as to write out most of the applications for grants himself. After he was withdrawn, the local group proved almost completely unable to formulate a sensible proposal for aid.
14. There is a sixth great area which has played an important part in our foreign aid program which many of us feel should be greatly reduced, if not abandoned altogether. In any case it should be completely divorced from other forms of technical assistance and separately budgeted. I refer, of course, to military assistance.
15. There may be some sort of a military or foreign policy case to be made for providing military equipment to feeble nations in close proximity to militant communist countries. But it seems very hard to defend our contributions of military equipment to Latin American countries. Their

possible contribution to interhemispheric war is not likely to be other than morally significant. The prospect of intrahemispheric war is to be vigorously discouraged. Too many of the natural resources of Latin America are already being channeled into unproductive military establishments. Too much political unrest is caused by fanning ancient and pointless rivalries. We should direct our efforts to disarmament on a national basis, and to building up intrahemispheric mechanisms for keeping the peace. It will be an even greater calamity if the budding African nations are encouraged to build up armed forces on the theory that they will be able to protect themselves against communist invasion. Such a policy is certain to result in expanding the arms race to Africa and to diverting resources from the economic and social development, which is the best defense against communism.

16. If, in spite of what seem good arguments against military aid, the case for continuing it proves more persuasive, it should be clearly separated from other forms of assistance. At the present time we are fooling ourselves into believing that we are giving a lot of help to other countries when well over half the quoted figures represent a bookkeeping transfer from the foreign aid to the military budget for obsolete arms that should be completely written off.
17. As I reflect on the various problems outlined only very briefly under the five or six headings given above, it becomes clear that we in the Foundation are not in a particularly good position to advise the government agencies about specific programs and especially the details of such specific programs as they may be called upon to undertake in the future. Most of us do, however, feel that we have some important suggestions to make about procedures which apply very generally to almost all programs which may be undertaken abroad. Most of these procedural matters are pretty well covered, it seems to me, in CBF's memo of January 5.
18. Referring to page 3 of this memorandum, it seems to me that there can be no argument at all with his points 1 and 2. The same points have, of course, been emphasized by others, but little headway seems to have been made in implementing them. I think if we do say anything to the government on this subject, we should strongly urge the establishment of a real career service in foreign aid with emphasis on language training and other procedures to acquaint the newcomer with the culture in which he will be working. Personnel, of course, should be of high quality and they should be given adequate assurances of tenure, income, and so on. Similar emphasis should be given to CBF's point 2, about changing the financial rules of government operations so that overseas projects could be budgeted for long periods of time. The arguments for this are well known and need not be reviewed further here.
19. CBF's point 3, about establishing a board similar to the RF Board to review projects originating in the field, is novel to me and I think it a



good one, coupled as it is with the recommendation that the projects themselves should on the whole originate in the field with people familiar with the local situation and not come as the result of general directives from Washington. At this point JMW would like to emphasize that all political decisions should be made in the State Department. Foreign aid field officers should be concerned only with the economic, educational, or scientific merit of a given proposal, not its political significance. I also find myself in agreement with his points 4, 5 and 6. In regard to his point 5, about doing more subcontracting with non-government agencies, it seems worth pointing out that it might be worth undertaking a long-term effort to get local governments to give more autonomy to organizations such as universities and research councils. As a general rule, these institutions are much more closely tied to government ministries in underdeveloped countries than they are in the U. S. This makes it very difficult for the institutions themselves and for outside bodies who wish to cooperate with them to develop productive programs. Much too much time is taken referring simple decisions to the ministries, where the issues are not really very well understood. One sympathizes, of course, with the wishes of government to protect itself against extravagant schemes, or the danger that certain aspects of its educational system will develop more rapidly than others so as to create dangerous imbalances in the economy as a whole. I believe that these objectives could be satisfactorily protected by exerting over-all budgetary control while leaving the distribution of such budgets largely to the decisions of the administrative officers of the institutions concerned. Within the global figures agreed upon at regular biennial or triennial intervals, the local authorities should be allowed considerable freedom in setting salary scales, selection procedures for students and staff, curriculum standards, and so on. The better state universities in the U. S., with their independent boards of trustees, illustrate very well what one has in mind. The point seems worth emphasizing, even though it may involve from time to time statements and efforts which will be interpreted by the receiving country as an interference in internal affairs. Incidentally, it may be worth mentioning at this point that even in totalitarian countries like Russia, the Research Councils and the Academies of Sciences seem to enjoy a higher degree of autonomy than they do in neutral countries like India.

20. JMW would add a very important point. No projects should be undertaken unless the responsible parties can be sure in advance that the necessary personnel and facilities can be made available. This would seem obvious, but unfortunately we all know of instances in which ICA has made promises which it, in fact, could not fulfill.
21. If anything like the administrative reforms recommended by CBF and others can be instituted it should become unnecessary to seek advice from hastily assembled task forces. The necessary long-term planning would then be properly carried out by the trained staff who will know more about the opportunities than anyone else. Appropriate outside comment and consultation



might best be supplied through permanent boards of review, such as those hinted by CBF and exemplified by the study sections of NIH and NSF.

22. Having taken a brief look at the over-all national program, we can now turn our attention to the role of the RF and similar private bodies. Nobody expects such organizations to take responsibility for the total problem. They are, therefore, in a position to be selective and indeed they must be since their resources, both of money and personnel, are necessarily limited. Historically it has been their role to give primary attention to quality of operation, to experiments with new forms and techniques, to the advancement of knowledge, and to education only at its higher levels. There seems no reason to depart from these principles at the present time. The question of geographical concentration is perhaps more difficult, since we must recognize that the presence of the Foundation in a given area carries great prestige, and countries which get little or no attention from the RF may develop considerable feelings of neglect and resentment unless the situation is very carefully explained. Nevertheless, since the Foundation is not in a position to take responsibility for the over-all development of any country and must necessarily work at relatively high levels of sophistication, it is naturally drawn much more strongly to some situations than to others. To be specific, it would be exceedingly difficult at the present time, for the MNS group at least, to develop a program in medical education or even in public health in Liberia, since this country lacks the infrastructure upon which such advanced activities can be built. There are simply not enough people coming out of secondary school at the present time to justify the establishment of a good medical school or a medical research institute. Even a model public health demonstration area is more or less out of the question until more trained people become available. For the present time, therefore, it seems wise to leave the development of these countries to official agencies and private industry; even in more advanced areas it is proper for the Foundation to give some attention to other general factors before deciding on the development of specific programs. For example, it does not seem to us very wise to undertake our usual sort of program in Spain or Portugal at present. This is not because either of these countries lack a sufficient number of trained personnel nor the sort of institution with which we usually deal. The difficulty is that the government itself does not seem prepared to take such steps as the institution of full-time teaching and research positions in the universities, the provision of adequate basic facilities, minimal scientific equipment, and the like.
23. Even in areas in which such basic questions can be resolved satisfactorily, we still have a problem of deciding how far to diffuse our energies. The problem may be discussed under two headings: first, concentration and distribution within a single program area and second, the concentrating of the efforts of several different program areas in one institution. To take the first point, the usual argument for concentrating a single program like the Medical Sciences, for example, in a single

institution in a given area runs somewhat as follows. With limited funds and a limited staff it is more likely that concentration will result in visible progress. What is hoped for is a model institution whose excellence everyone will recognize and try to emulate. In fact the classical Flexner point of view was that once such an excellent institution was established all others in the area would be drawn along by some sort of invisible force. Noticeable inferiority would be so painful to the local authorities that they could not do other than bring their institution up to the standards set by the leader. Certainly there is something in this point of view, but the process is certainly not entirely automatic and it is still a fact that there are tremendous discrepancies among the medical schools in the U. S., even though adequate models have existed for nearly half a century. Nevertheless, it is probably easier to fight the battle of full-time positions, adequate salaries, adequate research space, and so on in all the departments of a single institution than it would be in a roughly similar number of departments scattered among several institutions. Furthermore, a faculty generally made up of people of similar objectives and capacity is likely to reinforce each other and develop a chain reaction directed toward excellence. The well-known metaphor of "critical mass" is frequently used to dramatize the advantages of this situation. It must be confessed, however, that opportunities for this type of concentration are not as frequent as might be supposed. Ordinarily they exist only in institutions which are starting from scratch. The classical example is, of course, the Johns Hopkins, but the same considerations apply to the two most successful schools in South America: Cali and Ribeirao Preto. An effort to reform and develop a school already in being is sure to run into points of resistance among the department heads and administrative officers lacking in capacity, motivation, and training to do anything other than what they have done in the past. There is also the danger, especially in underdeveloped situations, that the institution which is supposed to serve as a model gets so far out in front that the ones who are supposed to copy it merely become frustrated. They are more than likely then to attribute the success of the model school not to the energy and wisdom of the local group, but to the fact that large amounts of money and help are being poured in from the outside. Lacking these latter factors, they see no possibility of making an effort on their own. Incidentally, the tendency to exaggerate outside help as an excuse for doing nothing is very real. A case in point is the tendency of many Latin American medical educators and deans to overestimate the amount of RF help put into Cali by a factor of three or four.

24. In actual practice, therefore, most of us have found it wise while concentrating our efforts in one or two places in a given large area, to devote a considerable part of our energies to opportunistic development of particularly promising points in other institutions. Sometimes a particular department such as, for example, biochemistry at Belo Horizonte, is so much better than any other that it can be selected for development

into a training department which will produce teachers for other schools. Sometimes it may actually be more productive in this respect than the coordinate department in the school selected for special concentration. For the most part, however, the distributional efforts are limited to rather modest aid, especially in the forms of fellowships and small grants in aid to get returning fellows started on the right path. As more and more competent people accumulate in our schools of secondary interest, they develop sufficient esprit de corps and political influence to get the school started on a path of emulation of the model school in its area. This, in fact, is one of the classical methods of Foundation operation and its merits have been emphasized on several occasions by CBF in our verbal discussions.

25. There is certainly a lot to be said for such opportunistic behavior and I would not want to see us drop it entirely or even reduce it very much. I would much rather see us reduce, as we have, our activities in the advanced countries, so that we will have sufficient funds and energy to develop a program of concentration without too much sacrifice of current distributional efforts. The principal difference between our way of handling what I'm referring to as our distributional efforts and the institutions on which we are going to concentrate lies in the following consideration. By and large, our distributional efforts are confined to individuals whom we regard as very promising. In the institutions selected for concentration we cannot confine ourselves to this procedure for the over-all objective is a really well-rounded effort. It follows, therefore, that if we find a weak department in such places, we cannot content ourselves with passing it by; instead we must take active steps to make the situation good enough to justify further Foundation aid. If the department head is inadequate or is not on full time, we may have to supply the funds for employing a new and better person on a full-time basis. If a local individual of sufficient stature is not available, we may have to assign a staff member or make some other arrangement for contracting the services of a person from overseas. This has been done successfully in several pilot instances, but I believe it is a mechanism we should use much more frequently. If an adequate building is the bottleneck, we should make some sort of contribution, probably on a matching basis, to see that the building is built, and so on.
26. Point number two (the problem of developing an entire university) is in many ways merely an extension of point number one, but it deserves separate treatment since we have so little experience in developing institutions on an inter-program or an inter-disciplinary basis. Here, it seems to me, we have almost by definition to talk only of concentration. There are only a few places in the world where all programs can work together to develop a model institution incorporating all our interests. But we must try somewhere, for it is clear to all of us that



we cannot go on indefinitely developing medicine, for example, unless the basic sciences, the social sciences, and the humanities, not to mention agriculture, develop along with it. A good medical man needs all these subjects in order to function properly and the whole object of a medical school, which is the better health of a population, cannot be expected to prosper if the people don't get enough to eat. Furthermore, the medical school itself and the services which its graduates implement cannot be supported unless the country has a sound economic system, and this depends upon training personnel in the fields of the social sciences, business management, and so on. The whole argument of critical mass applies here too, since the more good departments there are in a university, the more one can look for cooperation to make the institution, as a whole, better.

27. Since it is very unlikely indeed that we will find institutions in which the existing personnel only needs encouragement and some outside money in order to develop the sort of institution we have in mind, it seems clear that we will have to make much more use of the mechanism referred to above - of providing top personnel from outside to develop certain key departments and training programs. Some of this can certainly be done by co-opting people for periods of years from other university staffs, but I suspect that we will frequently have to resort to putting them on our own staff as members of a career service in the development of overseas university education. Not only are we likely to recruit better people in this way, but I suspect that the long experience of the Foundation in conducting overseas work will tend to make such individuals more comfortable and more productive than if they were to serve on a temporary contract basis. The subtle morale factors of belonging to what is generally recognized as a crack service should not be overlooked. Another point in favor of such a plan is the fact that there are increasing amounts of money available for what might be called the peripheral aspects of educational development overseas. Few agencies seem prepared, however, to provide the basic brains which are to go into the effort. It is far easier for organizations like the NIH, the NSF, and even the ICA, to provide money for buildings, scientific equipment, incidental expenses of research, and so on, than it is to establish permanent staff positions. If we invest more in staff and brains, our dollars will therefore be able to exert an extraordinary leverage.
28. Perhaps it is premature to talk about definite choices of particular institutions, but the following comments may be in order. Certainly some institutions should be chosen in Latin America and two would not be excessive. The leading candidates at the moment seem to be Cali and Porto Alegre in Brazil. Both these institutions seem to be well and favorably known to officers representing all four groups in the Foundation. The administrative personnel in these places seem abler and better informed, than they are in most other places, and the institutions themselves are less sprawling and less subject to political pressure than most of the better-known universities in capital cities.



29. It would be wonderful if we could find a place we could all agree on in India, but there seems to be no obvious choice at the moment, and there is also some doubt as to whether the Indian ministries would welcome an effort explicitly designed to give one of its institutions a leading position over all others. The worst of it is that India probably needs a strong, reasonably independent institution of higher learning as much - or more - than any other country with which we are working. It seems unlikely that a country so large and so varied in composition can really realize its vast potentialities if all the thinking and planning for the future is done by a little clique of government officials more or less immune from informed and independent criticism. The stakes are so large that it might justify careful and prolonged study on the part of the officers of the Foundation and other interested parties to develop a real possibility for a strong, independent university.
30. Africa presents equally difficult problems but of a rather different character. Personally, I am not sanguine about the possibility of establishing one institution to serve the whole continent. It is too large, too heterogeneous, and things have developed too far already to make this possible. Leaving aside the Congo and the Portuguese areas as too politically unstable at the present time for intelligent appraisal, it looks as if we're going to have to deal, at a minimum, with one institution for the French areas, and three for the British: one in West Africa, one in East Africa, and one in Central Africa. This doesn't mean, of course, that we have to deal equally with all four, but I think we would be fooling ourselves if we decided to concentrate on one with the idea that it will have very much influence on the other three. Leaving this point aside, there are still strong arguments for concentrating, at least at the outset, on one place - and my vote would go for Ibadan. The general reasons for this decision are: 1) It is already well known to Foundation officers and has received a good deal of aid in several different fields already. 2) It is the most important institution in the largest and possibly the most advanced English-speaking country south of the Sahara and north of the Union. There is danger, of course, of the country splitting up into its three major divisions, but this throws no more doubt over the situation that the race problem does in Central Africa or the tribal problems do in Uganda. A good, strong university in Ibadan might actually serve to help the country stay together. 3) The Nigerians strike me as a particularly able, sincere, and energetic group of people.

RSM

RSM/gmb

SUMMARY

- I - Importance of differentiating between national program of technical assistance and role of RF. (Paragraph 1)
- II - Over-all purposes of program. Main purpose is, of course, "political" but this should be defined in broadest possible terms - approaching political stability by reducing the wide differences in conditions which now afflict the world. (Paragraph 2)

Technical assistance is a modern extension of the characteristic and peculiar human capacity to accumulate and share knowledge - his typical mode of biological adaptation. (Paragraph 3)

It is a mistake to view our technical assistance effort purely as a weapon system in the conflict against communism. Both Western democracy and communism are put forward as methods of attacking backwardness. In this sense they are on the same side. We think our system is the better - in large part because communism has too limited a view of man and proposes dangerously limited solutions for his predicament. (Paragraph 4)

Nevertheless, for the short view at least, we must recognize that we are in conflict with communism. Thus, we must bear in mind CBF's injunction to make friends and influence people. This is not the final purpose of our program but only a means to a greater end. (Paragraph 5)

III - Nature of the problem.

- 1) Underdevelopedness must be attacked as a whole. (Paragraph 6)
- 2) Importance of primary education. In very backward areas large amounts of capital and personnel are needed to get the program off the ground. This effort unlikely to be self liquidating in a financial sense so outside help should be in the form of gifts. (Paragraph 7)
- 3) Health services almost as important as basic education.
  - a. In early stages personnel must be provided from outside to organize service and train personnel.
  - b. More attention should be given to developing new patterns for distributing medical care and preventive services.
  - c. Great efforts justified by necessity of eliminating poor health as a drag on labor productivity and as demonstration to people that something is really being done to improve their lot. (Paragraph 8)
- 4) Agriculture shows priority with education and health services. Dangers of providing food on a relief basis from U.S. surpluses. (Paragraph 9)

- 5) Building a viable economic system is a complex subject more effectively discussed by others.  
Much, if not all, of this effort should be financed in a self liquidating basis by World Bank, Export-Import Bank and private industry. ICA efforts have been less effective, perhaps because of political preoccupation and eagerness for immediate "impact" rather than long-term development. Note that Russia, after study of U.S. program, provided all economic assistance in the form of long-term, low-interest-bearing loans or trade agreements - not as gifts. (Paragraphs 10 & 11)
- 6) More explicit effort should be made to develop administration and managerial skills in backward countries.
  - a. Didactic courses or schools of administration probably of limited utility.
  - b. More should be done to develop on-the-job opportunities for managerial training in connection with technical assistance projects.
  - c. Fellows and travel grantees should be given more opportunity to observe and participate in administrative procedures in advanced countries. (Paragraph 13)
- 7) Military aid should, if possible, be sharply reduced, and in any case clearly separated from other forms of aid. (Paragraphs 14, 15, 16)

IV - The RF is not in a good position to give advice to the government agencies about the selection of specific projects, except in relatively few instances where they happen to know something about the project in question. We can, however, make some comments about methods and procedures. (Paragraph 17)

CBF has outlined five important procedural points. (Paragraphs 18,19)

- 1) "Improvement of the level of knowledge which aid personnel have of the country in which they work." RSM would supplement this with a specific plea for establishing a high-grade permanent career service.
- 2) "Foreign aid agencies should be permitted to budget specific projects for five years or longer."
- 3) "There should be fewer lump allocations by country." Here CBF makes the interesting suggestion that specific proposals should be originated by field officers who would return periodically to Washington to defend their proposals before a board analogous to RF Trustees. The "study sections" of the NIH might be another model.
- 4) "There should be a broadening of the concept of aid, i.e. to include help in labor, the press, radio, films, provision of books to general public, etc."

- 5) "There should be more subcontracting to non-government agencies within the U.S., especially universities."

Expanding this point RSM recommends a long-term effort to persuade cooperating governments to give more autonomy to universities and research councils, so that sister-sister agreements with institutes in this country can be carried out directly with less reference to cumbersome government channels.

- 6) "The overt standard of living of U.S. personnel abroad should be lowered to conform more closely to local standards."

If all these steps were taken, and I see no reason why they shouldn't be, then ICA would have less need to make emergency calls for help to outside bodies like the RF.

- V - 1) The RF must, for various reasons, limit itself to selected operations with emphasis on quality, experiments with new forms and techniques, the advancement of knowledge, and the higher levels of education. (Paragraph 22).
- 2) Geographical concentration within a single program area.
- a. Grants for "general development" must be concentrated on relatively few institutes in which we are prepared to help extensively in making up for existing deficiencies. (Paragraph 23)
- b. Other institutions in the same area should be dealt with opportunistically, building on strength. (Paragraphs 24, 25)
- 3) Cooperative efforts at institutional development involving several program areas. (Paragraph 26)
- a. Such efforts must be concentrated on only one institution in a given area. (Paragraph 28)
- b. We should be prepared to recruit permanent, or at least semi-permanent, personnel to help in developing such model institutes. (Paragraph 27)
- c. Brief discussion of possible places - Cali, Porto Alegre, Ibadan, India(?). (Paragraphs 28,29,30)