

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA

OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
BERKELEY, CALIFORNIA

April 3, 1942

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University of California
Enemy alien study

Dr. Joseph H. Willits
Director for the Social Sciences
The Rockefeller Foundation
49 West 49th Street
New York, New York

Dear Dr. Willits:

As you know, there is now proceeding on the West Coast a mass evacuation and resettlement of Japanese constituting a new experience in government-controlled migration. By following this program in its various aspects there is much to be learned of governmental, economic and sociological significance, but most important is the fact that events are happening so rapidly that, if advantage is to be taken of the research opportunities afforded by this situation, action must be taken immediately. Recognizing this fact, a group of social scientists at the University of California made a beginning in following these events thus far, assisted by a small grant from the Institute of Social Sciences, and anticipating that the very great importance of the problem would justify an appeal to one of the larger foundations for funds to pursue the study on an appropriate basis. The persons concerned are Dr. Charles Aikin, Associate Professor of Political Science; Dr. Milton Chernin, Assistant Professor of Social Welfare, Dr. Frank L. Kidner, Lecturer in Economics; and Dr. Dorothy S. Thomas, Professor of Rural Sociology and Rural Sociologist in the Experiment Station and on the Giannini Foundation.

Attached is a statement prepared by this group in support of an application for funds and including a proposed budget for the first year of operation. It is likely that the migration of Japanese, and possibly of other groups, will continue throughout the duration of the war, and there will be many post-war problems which should be considered if the fullest value is to be obtained from the projected studies. For this reason it appears desirable to plan in terms of a program of at least three years' duration.

I shall appreciate it, therefore, if you will take this letter as a formal application to the Rockefeller Foundation for an initial grant of \$45,000 to be expended over a period of one year, beginning at the earliest possible date which can be arranged, and with the expectation that, subject to satisfactory progress being made within the year, further requests for funds in approximately the same amounts per year may be submitted, in order to permit continuation of the studies to a proper point of conclusion. While I am reluctant to present a proposal which is not specifically delimited as to funds, I am sure you understand that, under the circumstances, it

Dr. Joseph H. Willits

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April 3, 1942


cannot be otherwise.

All of this material has been rather hastily drawn, but I believe that the situation has been set forth clearly. However, if there are any questions, I shall be glad to answer them.

Because of the tremendous importance and the far-reaching significance of these studies, I earnestly trust that the Foundation will find it possible to grant this request.

With kindest personal regards, I am

Yours sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Robert H. Sproul". The signature is written in a cursive style with a large, looping initial "R".

THE MECHANISM AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE WARTIME CIVILIAN
CONTROL PROGRAM FOR THE EVACUATION AND RESETTLEMENT OF
CERTAIN CLASSES OF THE POPULATION

On January 28, 1942, the Army requested the United States Department of Justice to make and carry through plans for evacuating about 25,000 enemy aliens from areas which were being designated as "prohibited" for these classes in the coastal areas of California, and, at the same time, to plan the enforcement of certain restrictions on the activities of enemy aliens in other areas of strategic importance. On January 31, District Attorney Biddle delegated to Governor McNutt, Coordinator of Defense, Health, and Welfare Services "the task of facilitating the transfer of alien enemies from areas designated by me and to relocate and reestablish such aliens in appropriate places and in appropriate activities." Governor McNutt in turn asked Mr. Richard Neustadt, Western Regional Director of the Federal Security Agency to handle the details of the evacuation procedure. Evacuation deadlines were set for February 15 and February 24.

The two weeks' period preceding the first evacuation deadline was one of intense confusion, engendered by uncertainty as to procedure on the part of the various agencies concerned; conflict between local, state and federal authorities; activities of pressure groups of various sorts. Rumors were rampant, and the local press and radio issued dramatic and conflicting statements from day to day -- on certain days, even from hour to hour. In some of the local communities the threat of vigilantism developed, and official and private groups in neighboring communities and states passed resolutions and took other measures to prevent the influx of individuals or families from the evacuated areas. No property custodian was appointed and, as a result, alien property was liquidated privately, and often ruinously. The feeling of insecurity engendered by this situation spread rapidly from the groups immediately affected to those in contiguous areas and, finally, to the American descendants of the alien Japanese.

Before the second deadline was met, President Roosevelt on February 19, 1942 signed an executive order authorizing the Secretary of War, and military commanders whom he might designate, to delimit military areas from which any or all persons (irrespective of citizenship) could be excluded. On the following day, the Secretary of War named General De Witt as the military commander to carry out the provisions of the Executive Order. Events then moved swiftly. In successive public proclamations, General De Witt designated military zones in the states of California, Washington, Oregon, Arizona, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, and Utah. From some of these zones, evacuation of specified classes would be required; from others, restrictions on activities would be imposed. Classes of the population to be affected were listed in order as, (1) Japanese aliens (2) Persons of Japanese ancestry (3) German aliens (4) Italian aliens.

The first two of these classes were urged to evacuate voluntarily from prohibited areas as soon as possible. Voluntary evacuation, however, proved to be slow and ineffective. A War Relocation Authority was thereupon set up, areas for reception and resettlement were found, and on March 27, 1942 an order was issued "freezing" all the classes of people mentioned above in specified military zones as of midnight March 29, 1942. Orders followed establishing dates by which classes (1) and (2) must move to government-controlled and government-designated locations.

The above indicates, in broad outline, the beginnings of a unique and dramatic episode in American social history: migration of masses of people, enforced by government action, selective of specified classes of the population -- a marked departure from the historical pattern of migration, largely individual in nature, on a voluntary basis, and more or less random in its selectivity.

From its inception several members of the faculty of the University of California have been working closely on the problem in the belief that this evacuation and resettlement not only represent an extremely important social experiment, the progress of which will throw into clear perspective many of the sociological, economic, administrative and political hypotheses on which social scientists have been working for decades, but also may have practical implications. For, it may well be that this event is not unique but may be the precursor of a new policy and pattern of controlled rather than voluntary migration. Thus far the investigators have devoted their efforts largely toward building up a record, from fragments, of the formation of the policies of evacuation and resettlement. To this end, they have had extraordinary cooperation from several of the agencies involved, representatives of which have made their confidential files available, permitted the investigators to be present at policy-forming conferences, and submitted with good will to interviews and informal questioning.

The scope of the problem is so great, however, that the investigators are convinced it will not be practical to proceed further in this casual way. Resettlement cannot be studied by interview or correspondence. Observations must be made in the field and over a long period. The predisposing political situation, local and national, should be investigated much more thoroughly by assistants or collaborators. The longer-run economic effects of the dislocation will require much more intensive analysis than has, up to the present, been possible.

It is proposed, therefore, to seek support from an outside agency involving a grant for a period of three years, to enable the central staff to develop the study of this problem to the extent that its importance demands. Ordinarily, plans for a study of this magnitude should be developed slowly and in detail. The swiftness with which the situation is developing, however, makes such preliminary planning impossible. Time is of the essence, and research plans must necessarily be shaped in accordance with the swiftly changing pattern of the situation itself. A considerable degree of flexibility is required in both planning and procedure of the research and the same is true in regard to the distribution of the budget.

As the investigators envisage the problem at present, it has three aspects:

1. The governmental, which involves two main problems:

- a. The formulation of policy.
- b. The administrative execution of such policy. Each of these aspects presents significant and interesting problems for study, including
 - (1) the constitutional and legal issues raised by the evacuation.
 - (2) the role played by the various branches of the government on each level in policy making and execution.

- (3) the relationships of the several administrative agencies of the federal government concerned with the evacuation, in Washington, in the field and between Washington and the field.
- (4) the relationship of state and local agencies to the entire program.
- (5) various administrative problems as they develop in the program.

2. The economic; that is,

- a. The economic conditions predisposing the formulation of policies.
- b. The economic consequences of the program, in the broader sense, with respect to labor supply in both origin and destination, and the effect of the movement on various aspects of the national and local economy.
- c. Financial considerations arising out of the custodianship situation.

3. The sociological; that is,

- a. The effects upon social institutions (family, education, community organization, religion, etc.) of the groups concerned.
- b. The effects upon social behavior of individuals, including in this behavior social attitudes.

A small central staff, located at the University of California, will be required. This staff will be concerned with planning the research and analyzing data from the field. The field staff will be recruited from among the teachers, welfare workers, recreation workers, etc., employed in the resettlement areas. The approval of the Relocation Authority has already been obtained in regard to two points: (1) that certain of these workers will be appointed on recommendation of the central staff, and (2) that they will work for the government only part-time in these functional activities, their salaries being supplemented from research funds. The reason for this type of field assistance is the undesirability of having people in the communities who do nothing but make observations and research records as this might lead to resentment and suspicion on the part of the settlers. The investigators already have in mind several excellent candidates (both Caucasians and Americans of Japanese descent) whom they can recommend immediately for consideration.

Regarding the central staff, it was agreed that selected members of the faculty of the University of California would assume the responsibility for direction and analysis and that an effort would be made to obtain a collaborator in the East. The staff would need an executive assistant, and it was agreed to ask the Social Science Research Council in New York to grant a year's leave of absence to one of its office staff who is known to have had the experience necessary for this work.

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is solved?*

who?

BUDGET

A flexible budget, not to exceed \$45,000 will be required for the first year. The budget for subsequent years would be planned after the project is under way.

The proposed budget is as follows:

Central Staff-Headquarters University of California at Berkeley

1. On the governmental aspects (Dr. Milton Chernin)	no salary	
2. On the sociological aspects (Dr. Dorothy S. Thomas)	" "	
3. On the economic aspects (Dr. Frank L. Kidner)	" "	
4. On the interrelations among governmental, economic and sociological aspects (Dr. Charles Aikin)	" "	
5. Executive assistant to central staff	\$ 3,000.00	-
6. Clerical, stenographic, statistical assistance for central staff	3,000.00	
7. Part-time research assistants for central staff (4 at half time)	4,000.00	
8. Travel and maintenance (when away from headquarters) for central staff and assistants	5,000.00	
9. Supplies and miscellaneous	1,000.00	

Staff in the Field

10. Supplements to salaries of part-time workers in resettlement areas	20,000.00	
11. Assistance for collaborator in Washington	<u>4,000.00</u>	
	Total	\$ 40,000.00
12. Contingencies	<u>5,000.00</u>	
	Grand Total	\$ 45,000.00

EXPLANATION OF ITEMS IN THE BUDGET

Items 1, 2, 3, 4: No compensation will be required for the senior staff members. Work on this project will be accepted as part of their duties at the University of California where they are full-time members of the faculty. (Should it be necessary to supplement this staff with other members of the faculty of the University of California, their services, also, would be rendered without special compensation.)

Item 5: A competent executive assistant with experience equivalent to the P2 or P3 level in the Civil Service will be required. This assistant will be responsible for carrying out procedures developed by the senior staff; for keeping in close contact with the field staff; for hiring and directing the clerical, stenographic and statistical assistants.

Item 6: It is planned to employ one full time person, competent both as stenographer and computer, at about \$2000 per year; and to supplement her services with temporary assistance, as required.

Item 7: It is planned to utilize qualified graduate students on a half-time basis. These assistants will be directly responsible to the senior staff members.

Item 8: As many as three trips to Washington, D. C. may be required by members of the senior staff. Since it may be necessary to spend two or three weeks in Washington on these occasions, the cost of travel and maintenance is estimated at \$500 per trip or \$1500 in all. It is further estimated that the staff and assistants will spend 500 man-days away from headquarters in the western area. At \$5 per diem, maintenance will amount to \$2500. To this is added \$1000 for railway, bus, or other transportation costs in the western area.

Item 9: It is planned to use University equipment including office space, typewriters, calculating machines, as far as possible. Purchases will, however, be necessary in case of shortages, and paper, postage, duplicating materials, etc. will have to be provided from the budget.

Item 10: A minimum of twenty, but possibly as many as thirty, field workers will be required. As indicated, these will be on a part-time basis under the government payroll. It is estimated that the supplement to their part-time salaries will average \$750 per year, with a range that may extend from as little as \$50 to as much as \$1200 in individual cases. An estimate of this item is \$20,000.

Item 11: It is assumed that the eastern collaborator (a) will work largely through research assistants and that (b) he will require some clerical, stenographic and statistical assistance. Item (a) may run to \$2500 and (b) to \$1500.

Item 12: Because of the impossibility of planning the study in greater detail at this time, a contingency fund of at least \$5000 will be required, to be allocated to any one of the items 5-11, inclusive, at the discretion of the senior staff.

U. Calif:

4.7-42

Foot Controlled Japanese Migration

4/3 request for 45000 probab x 3.

1. First and last, I acknowledge the importance of "right" public relations in such a matter. My problem rests rather in seeing how the public interest would be surely served (and not diserved) by domination participation in any way, and specifically in the way proposed, for such reasons as:
2. Is it conceivable that a private organization is wanted in such a situation, and even so, how could it work effectively in harness with compulsory arrangements dictated by the war emergency or official regulations?
3. What could a private organization or effort do besides be a cushion or smokescreen in situations that might better be met and resolved openly and promptly by the one authority involved?
4. Is it likely that any experience captured would be applicable later in different situations?
5. The next to last War recognizes the critical difficulty of getting reliable data, but is there any substantial likelihood that it would be secured objectively, scientifically or in any worthwhile degree by the kind of part-time, governmental employees suggested, under the given military conditions?

With every sympathy, in other words, I must confess that my reaction to the proposal as outlined is almost completely negative and one of serious doubts that it involves a place or job of any kind for it or any similar formal organization.

It ~~comes~~ ^{strikes} me instead as a sort of emotional ~~outburst~~, 'let's do anything but let's do something' outburst, well intentioned, but with all too little regard for the possibilities that:

- a. It may not be wanted, or wanted for any good purpose.
- b. Conditions now may prevent a useful or effective study to be made, or later may prevent its application, even if made.
- c. It might actually prove a disservice by complexity, confusing, or delaying real ~~solutions~~ studies and solutions by the authorities responsible.
- d. Granting even that a worthwhile capture and record study could be made (I take it that operations or counselling is not our province), of what genuine significance would it be, at even a fraction of the proposed cost?

Without reflection, it sounds like our friend Dick Reustadt the individual proposing something for the emotional relief of S. Reustadt the official with a headache. &

have to feel however that time would
show a better treatment ~~to be~~ - so far as
civilians are concerned - to lie along such
lines as:

- ⑤ the posev conference proposed by JMW -
with RF not entering except as sponsorship
might help catalyze sounder policy and
action by those properly and immediately
concerned.
- ⑥ Official consideration of such measures
as JG McDonald proposes in the Times
letter attached.

R.F.K.

4-7-44

JHW

- 1 I agree in the main with RFE.
- 2 It is difficult to study the effect of any social experiments. This one has many compulsory features.
- (3) There is no adequate organization, no limitation of the proposal.
- (4) The field staff would be in a dual role, to me, their position would even be an unethical one.
5. The legal problem could be studied as well away from the setting as in it.
- (6) To me the project was planned too soon to know what gaps ^{will} need attention. In each of the states and in behalf of the Federal govt. there will be much study of specific parts of the venture. Could not scholars contribute more by finding out the salient things that will be left undone?
- (7) Since one could appropriately study the administration of the plan. Later a sample area may need study.
- (8) We at most could give a chance for discussion in the area, though I

Leas that even that might raise
hopes.

I would be sympathetic but
slow in touching this problem in
its entirety. There is much need
of getting down to fewer areas,
fewer problems, and fewer advisers,
as it is the plan has no central
guidance.

Finally we have no surplus.
To go into such a large venture
and no assurance that
migrations from other areas may
not follow that on the Pacific

4/13/42

Returned to JHw
by Donald Young